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Ethics and Economics: A number of your works are inspired by the concept of capability as 
presented by Amartya. Sen. Numerous researchers have conducted comparative 
analyses between your work and his. How would you describe you work in relation 
to his ? 
 
Martha C. Nussbaum: First of all, let me point out that the concept is actually far older 
than Sen. I trace it back to Aristotle, and there is a long left-wing Aristotelian 
tradition that has influenced both Sen and me. This tradition includes the 
humanistic early works of Marx and the works of British socialists T. H. Green and 
Ernest Barker. I began working on these ideas before I knew Sen's work, talking 
about Aristotle's political thought. So while it is correct that Sen introduced the 
concept into economic thought, he was not the first who introduced it into 
philosophy. There was already an interesting political use made of it by Green and 
other left- wing British liberals, who disputed the idea that freedom means letting 
parents contract freely for the labor of their children. They took a stand that split 
the British liberal party: favoring compulsory public education, they insisted that 
true freedom is a function of a person's capabilities, what they are actually able to 
do and to be. It is ridiculous to say that children are free if, due to lack of 
education, they are not able to have any real choices in life. This point was 
actually made already by Adam Smith: in The Wealth of Nations he praises the 
Scottish custom of universal education and attacks England, saying that the failure 
to educate working class children meant that their human powers are "withered 
and deformed." That is the key idea of the capabilities approach. Green and Barker 
then gave the idea of human development an Aristotelian flavor and connected it 
to the language of capability and human flourishing. 
 
 I give a lengthy account of the relationship between my work and Sen's in two 
places: in the introduction of my book Women and Human Development (2001), 
and in a recent article in the journal Feminist Economics, the special issue on Sen, 
vol. 9 (2003), 33-59, entitled "Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and 
Social Justice." To focus on the most important differences only: I use the idea of 
capabilities as the basis for a minimal theory of social justice. Mapping out an 
account of the Central Human Capabilities, I argue that a society that fails to 
secure these to people at some appropriate threshold level falls short of justice, 
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whatever other good things it contains. I argue that the ten capabilities on my list 
are inherent in the notion of human dignity, and a life in accordance with human 
dignity. I connect capabilities with the use of a political conception of the person 
that is Aristotelian rather than Kantian in spirit, focusing on need and sociability as 
well as rationality, and seeing rationality and bodily need as thoroughly intertwined. 
None of this is in Sen. He uses capabilities only for comparative purposes, and he 
has never pronounced on the level of capability that a society has to have in order 
to be just. I argue in the article I mentioned that if he ever does face this task he 
will have to enumerate the most central capabilities, something that so far he has 
done by example only. I think that our approaches are for the most part 
compatible, but I am interested in getting a definite account that can be used for the 
purposes of constitution-making, for example, whereas Sen is mainly interested in 
shifting the ground on which nations are compared with one another. 
 
E&E: It is common practice in economics to use the terms individual, economic agent 
and person without any particular distinction between them. You refer to the 
capabiliy of a person. How would you define the concept of a person ? 
 
M.N.: I do not distinguish between "person" and "human being" as some philosophers, 
particularly in the Kantian tradition, do. I think all human beings, including those 
with severe mental disabilities, are persons with human dignity, worthy of inclusion, 
respect, and citizenship. I also think that nonhuman animals are worthy of respect, 
but I don't call them persons, because that would sound odd. 
 
E&E: You seem to reject the theory of a social contract as defined by Rawls. What are 
your reflections on his book A theory of justice, especially regarding his 
references to Kant which he developed in the 1980s ? 
 
E&E: I think that the theory of the social contract has made enormous contributions to 
political philosophy. So if I now am writing a book in which I engage critically 
with Rawls's version of it, it is only because I think so well of such theories, and 
particularly of Rawls's great theory. The differences that I map out are subtle, and it 
takes me 300 pages to say what they are, so it is very difficult to do that here. 
There are three problems that, following Rawls himself, I hold to be very difficult 
ones for a contractarian theory like his to solve: justice to people with disabilities, 
justice across national boundaries, and justice to non-human animals. He himself 
recognized that for various reasons these are problems, to quote him, on which 
"justice as fairness may fail." That means that they are also very revealing ones for 
the structure of the whole theory, and important problems in their own right. That is 
what my book in progress is about. Three areas of Rawls's theory are singled out 
for criticism: (1) his use of wealth and income (rather than capabilities) to rank 
relative social positions; (2) his use of a Kantian political conception of the person, 
in which moral rationality is the central attribute of persons; and (3) his acceptance 
of David Hume's account of "the circumstances of justice," in which a rough 
equality of power and ability is a necessary feature of parties in the original 
contract situation. All three of these features of the theory give us difficulties 
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when we deal with the claims of citizens with mental disabilities and the claims of 
non-human animals. The first and third cause grave problems for people with 
physical disabilities as well, and for thinking about justice across national 
boundaries. 
 
E&E: What are your reflections on the contemporary philosophy which focuses on the 
responsibility of the individual and as presented for example by Emmanuel Lévinas 
or Ricoeur or Jonas ? 
 
M.N.: I have never studied any of these figures in depth, with the exception of some 
parts of Ricoeur's work, in connection with a conference we gave here recently in 
his honor. (For many years he was a faculty member in my University, but he left 
before I arrived.) This is my deficiency, but I have to refuse to answer the question 
on grounds of ignorance!. Although the lamentable division between "continental 
philosophy" and "analytic philosophy" has lessened in recent years, and although the 
work of Habermas and Rawls crosses this divide quite easily, I fear that the figures 
you mention are still not really in conversation with ethical thought in the Anglo-
American tradition. The only part of Ricoeur's work I studied in depth was his 
theory of tragedy, on which I wrote a little paper in a volume edited by John 
Wall. But that doesn't bear on his account of responsibility. 
 
E&E: You have also written about gender. Do you believe that we could draw up an 
exhaustive list of capabilities and that this list would be distinct for men and 
women ? What would be the base for creating such lists ? 
 
M.N.: My book Women and Human Development and the earlier book Sex and Social 
Justice are all about this question, so again, it is a little hard to give a succinct 
answer. But since capabilities, as I understand them, are like rights, that is, urgent 
goals that a society must secure to its citizens if that society is to be a just one, 
then of course all citizens should have these capabilities on a basis of equality. I 
emphasize the fact that often we may have to devote special effort or expense to 
producing capabilities in people or groups who have been persistent victims of 
discrimination: thus we might need to spend more money on educating women 
than men, in a country where women have traditionally not been equally educated. 
I don't think that my list of capabilities is exhaustive: it is not supposed to be. It is 
supposed to be a list of the most urgent things, without which no society can claim 
to be just. The basis is my argument that each of these is inherent in the idea of a 
life with human dignity. 
 
E&E: More recently, you have insisted on the capabilities of animals and their relations 
regarding man’s well being. Would such a concept not jeopardise the concept of 
the person ? How could you bring together the capacities of the person and that of 
animals without decreasing the importance of the former ? 
 
M.N.: I think that both human beings and non-human animals are worthy of respect. The 
capabilities that one would protect for each species will vary to some extent with 
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the species, but there will be a lot of commonality. All sentient beings, for 
example, are entitled to a life with bodily integrity, health, freedom from 
unnecessary pain, the opportunity for affiliations with others, and the opportunity 
to play and enjoy life. I don't see why admitting that other species deserve respect 
jeopardizes the way we respect human beings. I think it actually helps us see what 
we are respecting when we respect a human being, namely, a certain type of living 
animal. We don't think well about ourselves when we cut ourselves off in an 
arbitrary way from the rest of the animal kingdom. Of course the decision to respect 
animals politically will give rise to some difficult conflicts. If we judge, for 
example, that medical research using animals will have to be gravely limited, we 
will forgo some benefits for human health. It is my hope that increasingly, as 
science matures, we will find ways of advancing research that do not use animals 
in ethically heinous ways. Research used to use human subjects (prisoners, for 
example, or people with mental disabilities) in horrible ways, and we stopped 
doing that! Right now, computer simulations increasingly offer prospects for 
ethically sound research that will still bring great insights. Once we recognize that 
there is an ethical problem in our use of animals, we will begin thinking more 
creatively about other ways to do the research. 
 
E&E: Do you believe that the ethics of responsibility could really help safeguard nature ?  
 
M.N.: I'm not sure what you mean by "the ethics of responsibility," and I'm also not sure 
what you mean by "safeguard nature," that is, whether you are focusing on animals, 
as I do, or thinking more of the environment in general. I myself have never taken 
a position on our duties to the environment more generally. In my view so far, 
although I hold this view tentatively and without much confidence, sentience is a 
necessary condition of moral entitlement. Thus insofar as we have duties to plants 
and the world of nature, I don't think of these as moral or ethical duties. Protecting 
the environment is very important for animals and human beings, and focusing on 
their interests gives us ample reason to work hard for environmental protection. But 
others, of course, believe that environmental protection is an end in itself. I look 
forward to pondering these arguments, and I might possibly shift my position. 
 
Interview with Martha Nussbaum 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 1, 2003  
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
5
 
SELECTED WORKS OF MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM 
 
Books 
Aristotle's De Motu Animalium, Princeton University Press, 1978 (paper edition 1985). 
The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986. Translated into Spanish and Italian; German in progress. 
Updated Edition with new Introduction, 2001. 
Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature, Oxford University Press, N.Y. 
and Clarendon Press, England, 1990 (paper 1992). German edition forthcoming; 
abridged edition in Swedish, forthcoming in Dutch. Introductory section, "Form and 
Content, Philosophy and Literature," reprinted in Carolyn Korsmeyer, ed., Aesthetics: 
The Big Questions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998) 201-7. 
The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, Princeton University 
Press, 1994 (paper 1996). Italian translation as Terapia del desiderio: Teoria e 
pratica nell'etica ellenistica (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1998). 
Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (The Alexander Rosenthal 
Lectures, 1991), Beacon Press, 1995, paper edition 1997. (Italian translation 
published as Il Giustizio del Poeta, Feltrinelli, 1996, Spanish translation as Justicia 
Poética, Andrés Bello, 1997). Chapter 3 published as "Rational Emotions" in Paul J. 
Heald, ed., Literature and Legal Problem Solving (Durham: Carolina Academic 
Press, 1998), 99-124. 
For Love of Country: A Debate on Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism (lead essay mine, with 
responses): Beacon Press, 1996; Italian translation, Feltrinelli, 1997. Updated Edition, 
2002. 
Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, Harvard 
University Press, 1997. Extract published in The Norton Reader: An Anthology of 
Non- Fiction Prose, shorter tenth edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 633-47, 
and in Tenth edition pp. 1119-31. Italian translation published as Coltivare 
L'Umanità (Rome: Carocci, 1999). 
Sex and Social Justice, Oxford University Press, 1999. Winner, book award of the North 
American Society for Social Philosophy, 2000. 
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge University 
Press, N.Y., 2000. Indian edition published 2000 by Kali for Women, New Delhi, 
India. Italian translation, Il Mulino, 2001, under title Diventare persone: Donne e 
universalità dei diritti. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, The 
Gifford Lectures for 1993, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
Books edited 
Language and Logos: Studies in Greek Philosophy in Honour of G. E. L. Owen (with 
Malcolm Schofield), Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Logic, Science, and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Ancient Philosophy, by G. E. L. Owen, 
Duckworth and Cornell University Press, 1986. 
Essays on Aristotle's De Anima (with Amélie O. Rorty), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
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